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Court/Tribunal: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
Case: Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic
Date: November 12, 2009
Written by: Joseph Sellers
Procedural Posture
Pursuant to the Scheduling Order of October 15, 2009 and Rule 117(D) of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber delivered its judgment in the case
of the Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic. The events giving rise to the appeals took place in the
city of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, between August 1994 and November 1995. During
that period, Dragomir Milosevic held the position of Commander of the Sarajevo Romanija
Corps (“RSK”). The Trial Chamber found that the SRK soldiers under the command of
Milosevic were responsible for continuously sniping and shelling the area of Sarajevo, which
resulted in the death and serious injury of many civilians. The Trial Chamber thus found
Milosevic guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (the “Statute”) on various
counts. These counts included: planning and ordering the crimes of terror, as a violation of the
laws or customs of war (count 1); and murder and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity,
committed through sniping (counts 2 and 3) and shelling (counts 5 and 6). As a result of the
guilty verdict on count 1, the Trial Chamber dismissed the charges of unlawful attacks against
civilians (counts 4 and 7) as impermissibly cumulative on the grounds that the elements of the
crime of unlawful attacks against civilians are fully encompassed by the crime of terror in count
1. The Trial Chamber imposed a sentence of 33 years imprisonment.
Both parties appealed the Trial Judgment. Milosevic appealed on 12 grounds, and the Prosecutor
appealed on a single ground. On the basis of his appeals, Milosevic requested that the Appeals
Chamber acquit him of all charges. The Prosecutor appealed against the sentence and requested
that the Appeals Chamber increase the sentence to life imprisonment.
The Appeals
As his first basis of appeal, Milosevic argued that the elements of the crime of terror had not
been met. While the Appeals Chamber did hold that the Trial Chamber misinterpreted the actus
reus requirement by stating that “actual infliction of death or serious harm to body or health is a
required element of the crime of terror,” the Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber’s
legal error was “without impact” on its review of the evidence and subsequent finding of
guilt. The Appeals Chamber explained that the crime of terror only requires that “the victims
suffered grave consequences resulting from the acts or threats of violence” and that “such grave
consequences include, but are not limited to death or serious injury to body or
health.” Therefore, the Trial Chamber’s finding that “all the incidents imputed to the SRK
constituted unlawful attacks against civilians and thus caused death or serious injury to body or
health of civilians,” fulfilled the elements of the crime of terror. The Appeals Chamber went on
to clarify the applicable law on cumulative convictions relating to the crime of terror and
unlawful attacks on civilians, explaining that cumulative convictions are allowed because “each

of the offences in question has an element requiring proof of fact not required by the other.”
The Appeals Chamber rejected Milosevic’s argument that the Trial Chamber could not take into
account evidence of actual terror experienced by the civilian population in Sarajevo, holding that
the actual infliction of terror was a reasonable factor to consider in determining Milosevic’s mens
rea.
As part of this first argument for appeal, Milosevic argued that the Trial Chamber failed to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the SRK attacks targeted civilians because it failed to
consider areas of Sarajevo held by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“ABiH”). The
Appeals Chamber rejected this argument because there is no requirement that areas be
designated military or civilian, and the distinction must be made on a case-by-case basis as to
who is targeted in each attack. The Appeals Chamber rejected Milosevic’s first ground for
appeal.
As his second basis for appeal, Milosevic argued that the Trial Chamber erred by considering
evidence that it had not admitted during trial. The Appeals Chamber dismissed this ground for
appeal.
Milosevic’s third contention on appeal was that the Trial Chamber failed to consider the
evidence as a whole, especially evidence concerning the military activity of the ABiH. The
Appeals Chamber rejected this argument because it found that Milosevic had failed to meet the
standard of review on appeal.
Milosevic’s fourth assertion on appeal challenged the Trial Chamber’s findings regarding the
civilian status of trams in Sarajevo, which were targets of SRK sniping on numerous days. Aside
from one sniping incident in which one soldier was alleged to be present, the Trial Chamber had
been satisfied that there were no military personnel present or in the immediate surroundings
during these incidents. The Appeals Chamber dismissed Milosevic’s claim, finding his argument
that the tram was a military target due to the presence of a single armed soldier untenable.
As his sixth ground for appeal, Milosevic challenged the Trial Chamber’s finding of fact
concerning the civilian status of various areas within Sarajevo. The Appeals Chamber held that
the Trial Chamber correctly engaged “in a case-by-case analysis of the targets and modalities of
attack, and not that of status of ‘zones’” and was satisfied that the Trial Chamber had correctly
established that the populations of the areas in question had civilian status at the time of the
attacks.
As his seventh argument on appeal, Milosevic challenged the Trial Chamber’s finding of fact
that SRK members were behind specific instances of sniper fire. The Appeals Chamber rejected
this ground for appeal because Milosevic “failed to demonstrate any discernible error” in the
Trial Court’s analysis of the evidence or reasoning.
Similarly, Milosevic challenged the Trial Chamber’s findings of fact regarding SRK
responsibility for certain shelling incidents of Livanjska street on 8 November, 1994, and the
Bascarsija flea market on 22 December, 1994. As to the first shelling incident, the Appeals

Chamber held that Milosevic failed to show that the Trial Chamber’s conclusions were
erroneous. As to the second incident, the Appeals Chamber noted the lack of clear evidence
regarding the origin of the shelling. Both shells that exploded in the flea market had come from
the south-east, the direction in which both the SRK and ABiH were positioned. The Appeals
Chamber stated that the Trial Chamber could have determined the source of the shells with more
precision, and held that the Trial Chamber “failed to address the deficiencies in the relevant
evidence and to articulate its reason for dismissing other possible conclusions with respect to the
origin of fire.” Therefore, the Appeals Chamber overturned Milosevic’s conviction for the
shelling incident of December 22, 1994.
For his ninth, tenth, and eleventh bases of appeal, Milosevic challenged the Trial Chamber’s
findings of fact regarding the possession and use of “modified air bombs.” In relation to shelling
incidents on 28 June 1995, 7 April 1995, and 23 August 1995, Milosevic challenged the Trial
Chamber’s findings of SRK responsibility based on a “general claim that ABiH possessed
modified air bombs.” The Appeals Chamber rejected all three grounds for appeal because, in the
case of the 28 June shelling, Milosevic failed “to show that no reasonable trier of fact could have
found…that the TV building was hit by a modified air bombs launched from SRK-held
territory,” and, in the case of the 7 April and 23 August shellings, Milosevic failed to
demonstrate that the Trial Chamber’s findings were erroneous.
As his twelfth basis for appeal, Milosevic challenged the Trial Chamber’s finding that he ordered
and planned the shelling and sniping attacks against civilians. The Appeals Chamber noted that
the Trial Chamber “relied on the nature of the [sniping campaign] carried out in the context of a
tight command” in its conclusion that the campaign could only have been carried out on
Milosevic’s orders. Due to this reliance, the Appeals Chamber was not satisfied that the Trial
Court established the existence of a positive act of ordering, which is required for the actus
reus. With respect to the actus reus of planning, the Appeals Chamber held that it could not be
established beyond a reasonable doubt that Milosevic was responsible for planning the campaign
of sniping of civilians. The Appeals Chamber found that it was unclear what evidence the Trial
Chamber relied on when it found that Milosevic was able to implement the greater strategy for
Sarajevo that was devised by his superiors. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber held that the Trial
Chamber “abused its discretion,” considering instances where Milosevic acted to prevent sniping
as proof that he had planned and ordered the sniping campaign. Finally, the Appeals Chamber
held evidence that “Milosevic generally controlled the sniping activity and training” does not
make the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Milosevic ordered all sniping incidents a reasonable
one. However, the Appeals Chamber noted that its findings about Milosevic’s personal
responsibility for the sniping incidents does not exclude holding Milosevic responsible for the
crimes committed through sniping under Article 7(3)of the Statute “for having failed to prevent
and punish the said crimes committed by his subordinates.” The Appeals Court held that,
although the Trial Court did not convict Milosevic under Article 7(3), the Trial Chamber did
make sufficient findings to establish his “command responsibility for the sniping incidents”
beyond a reasonable doubt.
As to Milosevic’s personal responsibility for the shelling campaign, the Appeals Chamber held
that it was not unreasonable for the Trial Chamber to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that all
of the shelling using modified air bombs and mortars by the SRK during the indictment period

could only have been done pursuant to Milosevic’s orders. The Trial Chamber relied on the
“established fact that Milosevic was directly involved in the use and deployment of modified air
bombs and issued orders regarding their use from as early as August 1994.” However, in
relation to Milosevic’s fourth ground of appeal, that he cannot be held responsible for shelling
incidents targeting the BITAS building on 22 August 1995 and the Markale Market on 28
August 1995 because he was receiving medical treatment in Belgrade, the Appeals Chamber held
that the Trial Chamber “did not establish the existence of the prior positive act required for the
actus reus of ordering.” The Trial Chamber had simply made an inference based on the totality
of the evidence that Milosevic had issued an order prior to his hospitalization. The Appeals
Chamber thus reversed the convictions for the two shelling incidents at issue.
The Appeals Chamber explained that these rulings pertain only to Milosevic’s individual
criminal culpability, and do not affect the conclusions that a campaign of shelling and sniping of
the civilian population in Sarajevo took place during the relevant period.
As to Milosevic’s fifth basis for appeal challenging his sentence, the Appeals Chamber held that
the Trial Chamber correctly took into account Milosevic’s planning and ordering gross and
systematic violations of humanitarian law. Milosevic’s orders to others were viewed as an
aggravating circumstance, being seen as evidence of Milosevic’s abuse of position. Therefore,
the Appeals Chamber rejected Milosevic’s fifth ground for appeal. However, the Appeals
Chamber held that the Trial Chamber impermissibly counted certain aggravating factors twice in
its sentencing considerations. However, even considering the aggravating factors only once
would lead to a sentence comparable to that which the Trial Chamber imposed.
The Prosecutor’s sole ground for appeal was a challenge to the sentence imposed by the Trial
Chamber. The Prosecutor argued for a life sentence. While the Prosecutor argued that the
sentence in Milosevic’s case was inadequate when compared to the sentence of Stanislav Galic,
the Appeals Chamber discounted the value of such comparisons because “the differences
between cases are often more significant than similarities.” In the end, the Appeals Chamber
found that the Prosecutor did not identify any discernible error in the Trial Chamber’s exercise of
its sentencing discretion, and rejected the Prosecutor’s appeal. However, due the Appeals
Chamber’s decisions to overturn certain aspects of the Trial Chamber’s decision, the Appeals
Court reduced Milosevic’s sentence from 33 years to 29.	
  

